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PRIVATE DATA, PUBLIC SAFETY:  
A BOUNDED ACCESS MODEL OF 
DISCLOSURE* 
MARY D. FAN** 
A growing volume of crucial information for protecting public 
health and safety is controlled by private-sector entities. The data 
are private in two senses—both proprietary and secluded from 
scrutiny. Controversies over corporate secrecy, such as sealed 
settlements that hide deaths due to product defects or 
nondisclosure of potentially hazardous substances, illustrate how 
corporate privacy and public safety can conflict. Courts are 
conflicted about when to defer to companies’ claims of the right 
to keep information private when important public interests are 
implicated by the data that companies refuse to disclose. This 
Article proposes allowing what it terms “bounded access” to 
share private data important to public health and safety with 
safeguards for the private interests at stake. 
In contrast to mandated public-disclosure regimes, bounded 
access would provide information access to trained professionals 
capable of effectively using data to detect health and safety harms 
while honoring data protections. The paradigmatic audience for 
bounded access disclosures is researchers overseen by 
institutional review boards and trained in how to minimize 
damage to data owners. Information aggregation and de-
identification can help protect the anonymity of the private 
entities and their product lines, thereby ameliorating the concerns 
of private entities regarding prematurely rousing consumer 
panic, injuring brand reputation, or destroying trade secrets. 
Such bounded access would address the limitations of general 
public disclosure, such as conflict with the Fifth Amendment 
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takings clause or piling more disclosure on the information-
overloaded consumer. Information would be rich in technical 
details to facilitate effective expert analyses rather than pared 
down for general public consumption. The proposed approach 
thus balances private-sector interests with the public interest in 
protecting population health and safety. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Information is power to govern, protect, and defend.1 To 
facilitate democratic decision making and to act as a check on power, 
the public can obtain information held by the government under state 
and federal sunshine laws.2 Increasingly, however, a treasure trove of 
 
 1. Cf., e.g., SUSAN STRANGE, THE RETREAT OF THE STATE: THE DIFFUSION OF 
POWER IN THE WORLD ECONOMY, at ix, 53, 100–09 (1996) (describing the relationship 
between information and power and how changes in methods of communication diffuse 
power). 
 2. As Justice Louis Brandeis famously wrote: “Sunlight is said to be the best of 
disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.” LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER 
PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914); see also, e.g., Adriana S. 
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information on matters affecting public safety and security are 
controlled by private-sector entities rather than the government.3 
Private-sector companies are generally not subject to sunshine laws 
that apply to government actors.4 Even the health and safety 
information that companies must report to governmental agencies 
can be shielded from disclosure based on claims of trade secrets, 
confidentiality, or proprietary information.5 Such data are private in 
two senses—both proprietary and secluded from scrutiny.6 
Corporations do not have a right to privacy, according to a 
longstanding rule.7 The literature on corporate privacy is generally 
 
Cordis & Patrick L. Warren, Sunshine As Disinfectant: The Effect of State Freedom of 
Information Laws on Public Corruption, 115 J. PUB. ECON. 18, 23–24 (2014) (discussing 
the impact of state sunshine laws on preventing public corruption). 
 3. For a discussion and numerous examples, see infra Section I.B. 
 4. See, e.g., Freedom of Information Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 
[hereinafter FOIA] (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 522 (2012)) (requiring federal 
agencies to maintain and disclose their records, subject to specific exemptions). 
 5. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2012) (providing an exemption under FOIA for “trade 
secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or 
confidential”); 100 Reporters L.L.C. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 307 F.R.D. 269, 277 (D.D.C. 
2014) (“[T]his court routinely has recognized that the submitter of documents to a 
government agency has a cognizable interest in maintaining the confidentiality of those 
documents . . . . ”); Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 975 F. Supp. 2d 
81, 91–93 (D.D.C. 2013) (allowing Pfizer to intervene to challenge disclosure of reports 
that the pharmaceutical company was required to submit to the Department of Health and 
Human Services under settlement agreements of litigation over promoting off-label uses 
of drugs). 
 6. See, e.g., WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1804–05 (2002) 
(providing three relevant definitions of “private”: [1a] “intended for or restricted to the 
use of a particular person, group, or class <a private park>”; [1b] “belonging to or 
concerning an individual person, company, or interest <a private house>”; [3b] “not 
known or intended to be known publicly: secret”). 
 7. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 284 
(1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“[A] corporation is ‘an 
artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law.’ As such, it 
is not entitled to ‘ “purely personal” guarantees’ whose ‘ “historic function” has been 
limited to the protection of individuals.’ Thus, a corporation has no . . . right to privacy.” 
(internal ellipses and citations omitted)); United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 
652 (1950) (“[C]orporations can claim no equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a 
right to privacy.”); Arnold v. Pa. Dep’t of Transp., 477 F.3d 105, 111 (3d Cir. 2007) (“The 
District Court correctly found that, as an entity, Baker ‘clearly had no privacy 
interest’ . . . .” (internal brackets omitted)); Crum & Crum Enters., Inc. v. NDC of Cal., 
L.P., Civ. No. 09-145 (RBK), 2011 WL 886356, at *3 (D. Del. Mar. 10, 2011) (“[B]usiness 
entities do not have a right to privacy.”); Warner-Lambert Co. v. Execuquest Corp., 691 
N.E.2d 545, 548 (Mass. 1998) (“Cases from other jurisdictions unanimously deny a right of 
privacy to corporations.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652I cmt. c (AM. LAW 
INST. 1977) (“A corporation as such has no right to privacy.”); cf. RESTATEMENT OF 
DATA PRIVACY PRINCIPLES § 2(1)–(2) (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 2, Oct. 24, 
2014) (focusing on privacy protections for personal information, defined as “any data that 
refers to an identified person” and “singl[es] out . . . a specific individual from others”). 
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focused on the issue of whether corporations should have the right to 
common law or constitutional privacy.8 In contrast, this Article 
illuminates how corporations enjoy plenty of privacy by other means 
and addresses the question of how the secrecy that shields them 
should be curtailed to protect the public. 
Who needs the right to privacy enjoyed by ordinary natural 
persons, when corporations can lock up information via property, 
contract, and trade secret law?9 The challenge that courts, agencies, 
legislatures, and citizens face is strong protection for private data that 
sometimes keeps secret information that is important for protecting 
the public.10 Examples of ongoing controversies include claiming 
 
 8. See, e.g., Anita L. Allen, Rethinking the Rule Against Corporate Privacy Rights: 
Some Conceptual Quandaries for the Common Law, 20 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 607, 626–38 
(1987) (analyzing whether corporations should enjoy the protections of common law 
privacy torts); Elizabeth Pollman, A Corporate Right to Privacy, 99 MINN. L. REV. 27, 84–
88 (2014) (discussing whether corporations should have a constitutional right to 
information privacy); Christopher Slobogin, Subpoenas and Privacy, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 
805, 815–17 (2005) (discussing the nonextension of Fifth Amendment protections to 
businesses that receive subpoenas). By corporate privacy, this Article means protections 
for corporations that affirmatively shield business information from disclosure. This is 
different than privacy protections for consumer information that corporations must honor, 
or material nonpublic information that securities laws require to be disclosed. See, e.g., 
Julie Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1929 (2013) (using the term 
corporate “privacy practices” to refer to how businesses use the consumer data they 
amass); Kenneth E. Scott, Insider Trading: Rule 10b-5, Disclosure and Corporate Privacy, 
9 J. LEGAL STUD. 801, 817 (1980) (discussing required disclosures of material nonpublic 
information under the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Rule 10b-5). 
 9. See infra notes 10–11 for examples and infra Part I for a discussion and more 
examples; see also, e.g., KIM LANE SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS: EQUALITY AND 
EFFICIENCY IN THE COMMON LAW 231 (1988) (“Although corporations have been held 
to have no right of privacy, corporate actions in trade secrecy look very much like personal 
actions in privacy for public disclosure of private facts.”). 
 10. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(G) (authorizing courts to prohibit discovery of 
“a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information”); 
Tavoulareas v. Wash. Post Co., 724 F.2d 1010, 1017–23 (D.C. Cir.), vacated on other 
grounds, 737 F.2d 1170 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (per curiam) (holding that the 
confidentiality of sensitive commercial information overcame the presumption of 
openness in discovery); Masonite Corp. v. Cty. of Mendocino Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 49 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 639, 648 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that emissions information designated 
as both “emission factors” and trade secrets by manufacturing company are not subject to 
public release); State ex rel. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs v. Ohio Envtl. Prot. Agency, 724 
N.E.2d 411, 417–20 (Ohio 2000) (refusing to order disclosure by hazardous-waste landfill 
operator of tracking information regarding processing and emissions of potentially 
hazardous materials); 160 CONG. REC. S2912 (daily ed. May 12, 2014) (statement of Sen. 
Sheldon Whitehouse) (“While confidentiality agreements can be useful tools to protect 
sensitive information and trade secrets, too often they are used to hide important safety 
concerns from regulators, policymakers, the news media, public health experts, and the 
general public. Over the past 20 years, we have learned of numerous cases where court-
approved secrecy has shielded serious public health and safety dangers from the public—
putting hundreds, if not thousands of lives at risk. These cases have involved hydraulic 
94 N.C. L. REV. 161 (2015) 
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trade secret protection against disclosing potentially hazardous 
ingredients or emissions; creating secret settlements that hide deaths 
linked to auto defects; or locking up drug counterfeiting information 
as “proprietary data.”11 
This Article discusses when and how the robust de facto privacy 
that corporations enjoy should yield for public health or safety 
reasons. The issue is of great legal import because litigants, concerned 
citizens, and regulatory agencies often seek data and face a lack of 
information access.12 Courts are divided over when to defer to 
companies’ claims of the right to keep information private—even 
when important public interests are implicated by the data that 
companies refuse to disclose.13 The question is a very timely and live 
 
fracturing, or ‘fracking,’ asbestos, defective auto components, and ‘adverse incidents’ from 
drugs.”); see also infra Part I for a discussion and more examples, including pending 
legislation. 
 11. See, e.g., State ex rel. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 724 N.E.2d at 417–20 
(nondisclosure of emissions information); 160 CONG. REC. S2912–13 (daily ed. May 12, 
2014) (statement of Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse) (discussing how secret settlements have put 
lives at risk); Robert Cockburn et al., The Global Threat of Counterfeit Drugs: Why 
Industry and Governments Must Communicate the Dangers, 2 PLOS MED. 0302, 0303–05 
(2005) (discussing concerns over the refusal of pharmaceutical companies to release drug 
counterfeiting investigation information under a claim that the data is proprietary); see 
also infra Section I.B for more examples and discussion. 
 12. See, e.g., Conn. Indem. Co. v. Superior Court, 3 P.3d 868, 874 (Cal. 2000) 
(discussing a claim by corporate entities that subpoenas issued by city officials 
investigating groundwater contamination with carcinogenic substances conflicted with 
their privacy interests); Cmtys. for a Better Env’t v. City of Richmond, 108 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
478, 490–91 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (discussing refusal of Chevron to show the public or 
decision makers proprietary data relied upon by its expert in evaluating refinery project 
impact); Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 709, 715 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1992) (holding that information about allegedly defective product was “potentially 
necessary” to plaintiffs alleging deaths due to defect but refusing to order disclosure due 
to claim of trade secrets); Powder River Basin Res. Council v. Wyo. Oil & Gas 
Conservation Comm’n, 320 P.3d 222, 234–35 (Wyo. 2014) (remanding for consideration of 
whether information regarding the identity of chemicals used in fracking is a trade secret 
not subject to disclosure); Opening Brief for Appellant General Motors Corp. at *15–16, 
*21, Phillips v. Gen. Motors Corp., 289 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2001) (No. 01-35126), 2001 WL 
34095231 (arguing that General Motors settlement information is protected by the 
confidentiality terms of the agreements); cf. Takeda Pharm., USA v. Burwell, Nos. 14-cv-
1668 (KBJ), 14-cv-1850 (KBJ), 2015 WL 252806, at *18 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 13, 2015) (arguing 
against consideration of third-party proprietary data by the Food and Drug 
Administration in fulfilling its duty to review the safety and effectiveness of marketed 
drug products). 
 13. Compare, e.g., Tavoulareas, 724 F.2d at 1017–25 (reversing the district court’s 
decision to grant the Washington Post’s discovery requests to Mobil Oil Corp. on grounds 
that the presumption of openness of discovery materials was overcome by Mobil Oil 
Corp.’s privacy interests grounded in its interest in sensitive commercial information), and 
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 715 (holding that information on potentially 
defective tires was not subject to disclosure even though “potentially necessary” to the 
case of injured plaintiffs because of trade secret protections), and State ex rel. Lucas Cty. 
94 N.C. L. REV. 161 (2015) 
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issue for Congress as well as the courts, with legislators introducing 
various bills in recent years to cut back some forms of corporate 
secrecy that conflict with public health and safety.14 
While there are extensive financial disclosure laws for publicly 
traded companies to ensure the financial wellbeing of the 
marketplace and protect investors,15 there is no general law of 
information access to facilitate the protection of public health and 
safety. Because of the lack of information access, concerned citizens 
and watchdog groups may have to sue to attempt to access 
information through discovery.16 The Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal17 and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly18 have 
heightened civil complaint pleading standards. This barrier-raising 
makes it easier to dismiss cases even before discovery, thereby 
 
Bd. of Comm’rs, 724 N.E.2d at 417–20 (holding landfill operator’s data on waste 
generators, relative amounts of waste generated, whether certain generators’ wastes failed 
tests more often and whether a waste generator’s chemicals had to be mixed longer to be 
properly treated for disposal were trade secrets that may not be disclosed), with Conn. 
Indem. Co., 3 P.3d at 874 (declining to decide whether corporations have a privacy right 
against disclosure of information to city officials investigating potential groundwater 
contamination), and Powder River Basin Res. Council, 320 P.3d at 235 (declining to decide 
whether chemical ingredients used in fracking are trade secrets not subject to disclosure).  
 14. E.g., Sunshine in Litigation Act of 2014, S. 2364, 113th Cong. (introduced May 20, 
2014) (endeavoring to prohibit courts from restricting access to information “relevant to 
the protection of public health or safety” by sealing such information in court records, 
ordering nondisclosure of such information obtained in discovery, or approving such 
restrictions in settlement agreements); Safety Over Secrecy Act of 2014, S. 2317, 113th 
Cong. (introduced May 12, 2014) (endeavoring to prohibit courts from approving 
confidential settlements that seal information relating to “protecting the public from a 
hazard to public safety or health”); Sunshine in Litigation Act of 2014, H.R. 4361, 113th 
Cong. (introduced Apr. 1, 2014) (prescribing protections similar to S. 2364); Sunshine in 
Litigation Act of 2011, H.R. 592, 112th Cong. (introduced Feb. 9, 2011) (prescribing 
protections similar to S. 2364); Sunshine in Litigation Act of 2010, H.R. 5419, 111th Cong. 
(introduced May 26, 2010) (similar); Sunshine in Litigation Act of 2009, H.R. 1508, 111th 
Cong. (introduced Mar. 12, 2009) (similar); Sunshine in Litigation Act of 2008, H.R. 5884, 
110th Cong. (2008) (introduced Apr. 23, 2008) (similar). 
 15. E.g., Investment Company Act of 1940, ch. 686, 54 Stat. 789 (codified as amended 
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa–77bbbb (2012)) (prescribing disclosure requirements for companies 
engaged primarily in investing and trading in securities and whose own securities are 
publicly offered); Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 10, 48 Stat. 74, 81 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 77a, 77j (2012)) (prescribing required disclosures in prospectuses to investors); 
Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 68 Fed. 
Reg. 5110 (Jan. 31, 2003) (codified as amended at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228–229, 249 (2014)) 
(discussing updates to financial disclosure requirements). 
 16. See, e.g., Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, Access to Information, Access to Justice: The 
Role of Presuit Investigatory Discovery, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 217, 270, 278–79 (2007) 
(discussing the use of pretrial discovery as a way for plaintiffs to investigate and get 
information they need but otherwise cannot get presuit). 
 17. 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 18. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
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reducing the ability of even the extreme approach of lawsuits to reach 
corporate information.19 
This Article proposes bounded access to address the challenge of 
unlocking legally shielded corporate data that directly impacts public 
health, safety, and security.20 Bounded access gives professionals—
who are obligated by professional ethics to honor data use and 
protection safeguards—the ability to view data that would otherwise 
be locked away.21 The paradigmatic examples of such professionals 
include attorneys, who are ethically bound to comply with court 
orders, and researchers, who are ethically bound to comply with data 
protections—and are even required to have Institutional Review 
Board (“IRB”) approval before acquiring and using sensitive data.22 
Such professionals can contribute expertise in detecting and 
evaluating threats to public safety, thereby serving as a check to 
ensure that dangers do not slip by government agencies, as well as 
addressing public safety issues that fall outside the domain of any 
regulatory agency at all.23 
Bounded access remedies the limitations of the dominant 
paradigm of disclosure to an information-pummeled consumer.24 The 
general concern of mandated disclosure regimes is to correct the 
imbalance in sophistication and information between the consumer 
 
 19. See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 10, 17–18, 50–52 (2010) (discussing 
the major impact of Iqbal and Twombly in shifting the “center of gravity of federal 
litigation . . . forward in time[,]”making the motion to dismiss of “potentially life-or-death 
significance[,]” thus constituting “a continued retreat from the principles of citizen access, 
private enforcement of public policies, and equality of litigant treatment in favor of 
corporate interests and concentrated wealth”); Jonah B. Gelbach, Note, Locking the 
Doors to Discovery? Assessing the Effects of Twombly and Iqbal on Access to Discovery, 
121 YALE L.J. 2270, 2325–32, 2338 (2012) (finding that Twombly and Iqbal have 
prevented plaintiffs in at least 21.5% of cases facing a motion to dismiss from even 
reaching discovery). 
 20. See infra Part III. 
 21. See infra Section III.A. 
 22. See, e.g., Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 458 (1975) (“We begin with the basic 
proposition that all orders and judgments of courts must be complied with promptly.”); 
Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Conduct of the Iowa State Bar Ass’n v. McCullough, 465 
N.W.2d 878, 885 (Iowa 1991) (“[A] lawyer has a duty to obey a court order and a duty not 
to advise a client to ignore it . . . . These principles are so obvious and basic that we should 
not have to remind the bar of them.”); John A. Robertson, The Law of Institutional 
Review Boards, 26 UCLA L. REV. 484, 485–94 (1978) (discussing the rise of IRB 
requirements for researchers and their institutions). 
 23. See infra Section III.A. 
 24. See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Static Versus Dynamic Disclosures, and How Not To 
Judge Their Success or Failure, 88 WASH. L. REV. 333, 335–39 (2013) (discussing 
disclosure regimes aimed at improving consumer decisions). 
94 N.C. L. REV. 161 (2015) 
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and the company.25 Companies are required to inform consumers of 
information relevant to smart decision-making—for example, that 
cigarettes kill, that one has the right to inspect a house for lead-based 
products before buying it, or that the effective mortgage rate is 
actually higher than the advertised rate.26 The information is often no 
secret; it is just not readily known to the humble, expertise-limited 
consumer.27 And even if the information is well known to all, society 
may want the facts to be conspicuous to the consumer at the point of 
purchase.28 
The challenge to access arises when information is made secret 
by contract, trade secret, or property. Courts, regulatory agencies, 
and disclosure laws tend to tiptoe around such claims of corporate 
 
 25. Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 
U. PA. L. REV. 647, 705–09 (2011) (discussing the aim of correcting the information 
imbalance between a company and the hypothetical “Chris Consumer”). 
 26. See, e.g., ARCHON FUNG, MARY GRAHAM & DAVID WEIL, FULL DISCLOSURE: 
THE PERILS AND PROMISE OF TRANSPARENCY 183–215 (2007) (analyzing examples of 
eighteen disclosure regimes); Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 25, at 653–71 
(presenting numerous examples of disclosures, such as credit terms, contract boilerplate, 
and health, insurance, financial, and other consumer disclosures). 
 27. Illinois, for example, requires lenders to provide the following notice before 
making a high-risk home loan: 
 
YOU SHOULD BE AWARE THAT YOU MIGHT BE ABLE TO 
OBTAIN A LOAN AT A LOWER COST. YOU SHOULD SHOP 
AROUND AND COMPARE LOAN RATES AND FEES. LOAN 
RATES AND CLOSING COSTS AND FEES VARY BASED ON 
MANY FACTORS, INCLUDING YOUR PARTICULAR CREDIT 
AND FINANCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES, YOUR EMPLOYMENT 
HISTORY, THE LOAN-TO-VALUE REQUESTED, AND THE 
TYPE OF PROPERTY THAT WILL SECURE YOUR LOAN. 
THE LOAN RATE AND FEES COULD ALSO VARY BASED 
ON WHICH LENDER OR BROKER YOU SELECT. IF YOU 
ACCEPT THE TERMS OF THIS LOAN, THE LENDER WILL 
HAVE A MORTGAGE LIEN ON YOUR HOME . . . . YOU ARE 
NOT REQUIRED TO COMPLETE THIS LOAN AGREEMENT 
MERELY BECAUSE YOU HAVE RECEIVED THIS 
DISCLOSURE OR HAVE SIGNED A LOAN APPLICATION. 
 
 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 137/95 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Public Act 98-1174). 
 28. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (2012) (requiring all cigarettes to bear one of the following 
disclosures: “WARNING: Cigarettes are addictive. WARNING: Tobacco smoke can 
harm your children. WARNING: Cigarettes cause fatal lung disease. WARNING: 
Cigarettes cause cancer. WARNING: Cigarettes cause strokes and heart disease. 
WARNING: Smoking during pregnancy can harm your baby. WARNING: Smoking can 
kill you. WARNING: Tobacco smoke causes fatal lung disease in nonsmokers. 
WARNING: Quitting smoking now greatly reduces serious risks to your health”); 15 
U.S.C. §§ 1601–1667 (2012) (requiring disclosure of interest rates and fees, including the 
annual percentage rate, a standardized measure of the cost of obtaining credit). 
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2015] PRIVATE DATA, PUBLIC SAFETY 169 
information secrecy rights, carving out exemptions from disclosure 
requirements.29 Moreover, in some cases, courts have found general 
public disclosure of health and safety information designated as trade 
secrets to be a taking of property without just compensation in 
violation of the Fifth Amendment.30 
Instead of general disclosures to information-overloaded 
consumers, bounded disclosure’s audience is expert professionals 
obligated by the ethical rules of their field to comply with protections 
for sensitive information.31 Bounded access would be permitted based 
on a showing of both a need to detect or prevent public health, safety, 
or security threats and a data-use plan with safeguards for sensitive 
information.32 Such protected access addresses Fifth Amendment 
takings claims.33 Bounded access also reduces the risk of prohibitive 
resistance by companies concerned about revealing sensitive 
proprietary data and suffering reputational damage from premature 
consumer alarm.34 Bounded disclosure thus optimizes the utility of 
disclosure so that the benefits are enhanced while the costs are 
reduced. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I discusses de facto 
corporate privacy secured through contract, property, and trade 
secret law, and how these protections can conflict with the need for 
data to address public health and safety challenges. Three 
contemporary controversies illustrate how the interests in private 
data and public safety can conflict. The first example involves 
claiming trade secret protection to avoid disclosure of potentially 
hazardous ingredients or emissions.35 The second example is the 
recurring controversy over secret settlements of suits involving 
defects resulting in injuries or deaths.36 The third example involves 
 
 29. See examples cited supra notes 5, 10, and infra Section I.B.1. 
 30. E.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1008–14 (2014); Philip Morris, 
Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 24, 35–47 (1st Cir. 2002) (en banc). For a discussion, see infra 
Section I.B.1.  
 31. See infra Section III.A. 
 32. See infra Part III. 
 33. For a discussion, see infra Section III.A. 
 34. See, e.g., Kathryn M. Braeman, Overview of FOIA Administration in Government, 
34 ADMIN. L. REV. 111, 113 (1982) (discussing the complexities of handling FOIA 
requests for business records submitted to agencies because the companies submitting the 
information “want[] the information protected at all costs” while the information-seeker 
“wants the information released at all costs”). 
 35. See infra Section I.B.1. 
 36. See infra Section I.B.2. 
94 N.C. L. REV. 161 (2015) 
170 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94 
the refusal of pharmaceutical companies to disclose proprietary data 
regarding the counterfeiting of their drugs.37 
Part II discusses how the prevailing approach of mandated 
general disclosure to consumers is insufficient to address the private-
data, public-safety conflict. In some cases, legislatures may face a 
formidable Fifth Amendment takings clause issue in mandating 
disclosure.38 Additionally, companies argue that general disclosures 
risk prematurely alarming consumers and damaging brand 
reputation.39 From the consumer’s perspective, such disclosures 
merely pummel people already suffering from information overload 
with another disclosure dump.40 Moreover, the typical general 
consumer is not an expert at digesting data to detect risks and 
formulate preventative measures, rendering disclosure an often 
fruitless mandate.41 
Part III proposes the bounded model of information access to 
balance the public interest in access with safeguards for sensitive, 
protected information. Such a model allows data access by experts 
and motivated groups that can demonstrate good cause to pierce 
corporate privacy to address important public health or safety 
issues.42 Rather than piling more disclosures on the bewildered, 
information-overloaded general consumer, bounded access is meant 
for specialists such as researchers or lawyers who are ethically 
obligated to comply with data use and protection safeguards and who 
are better situated to use their expertise to detect potential threats to 
public safety.43 Instead of what the Article terms “thin” information, 
which is distilled down and rendered catchy to communicate 
effectively to the individual consumer, bounded access uncovers 
“thick information,” including technical detail necessary to permit 
effective expert analysis.44 Bounded access also overcomes Fifth 
Amendment takings claims that have bedeviled attempts to mandate 
public disclosure of public health, safety, and environmental 
information implicating trade secrets. Bounded access can thus 
accommodate corporate privacy without allowing it to obscure or 
trump the public interest in protecting population health, safety, and 
security. 
 
 37. See infra Section I.B.3. 
 38. See discussion infra Section I.B.1. 
 39. See infra Section II.A. 
 40. See infra Section II.B. 
 41. See infra Section II.B. 
 42. See infra Part III. 
 43. See infra Section III.A. 
 44. See infra Section III.C. 
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I.  CORPORATE PRIVACY BY CONTRACT, PROPERTY, AND TRADE 
SECRET LAW 
Warren and Brandeis’s iconic article that launched the right to 
privacy discussed how contract and property law stretched and 
evolved to protect privacy before the formal designation of a right to 
privacy.45 “Although the courts have asserted that they rested their 
decisions on the narrow grounds of protection to property, there are 
recognitions of a more liberal doctrine,” wrote Justices Brandeis and 
Warren.46 In groping for protections, contract law also offered an 
avenue: “[T]he courts, in searching for some principle upon which the 
publication of private letters could be enjoined, naturally came upon 
the ideas of a breach of confidence,” stretching the principles of 
traditional contract law.47 
Today, it is well settled that natural persons enjoy the right to 
privacy as such, without need to stretch contract and property 
concepts to protect private information.48 It is often said that, in 
contrast to natural persons, companies do not have a right to 
privacy.49 As the foundational article on the right to privacy 
 
 45. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 
193, 204–12 (1890); see also, Melvin B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 203, 203 (1954) (discussing the influence of The Right to Privacy and calling the 
article “perhaps the most famous and certainly the most influential law review article ever 
written”). 
 46. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 45, at 204. 
 47. Id. at 211. 
 48. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A & cmts. a–d (AM. LAW. 
INST. 1977) (recognizing the right to privacy); William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. 
REV. 383, 384–89 (1960) (collecting the large corpus of cases since the Warren and 
Brandeis privacy article that cemented the formal right to privacy as such); Neil M. 
Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 
1887, 1891–95, 1903–07 (2010) (tracing the development and crystallization of privacy 
law). 
 49. E.g., Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 284 
(1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“[A] corporation is ‘an 
artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law.’ As such, it 
is not entitled to ‘ “purely personal” guarantees’ whose ‘ “historic function” . . . has been 
limited to the protection of individuals.’ Thus, a corporation has no . . . right to privacy.”) 
(quoting Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 536 (1819) and 
First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 779 n.14 (1978)); United States v. 
Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950) (“[C]orporations can claim no equality with 
individuals in the enjoyment of a right to privacy.”); Arnold v. Pa. Dep’t of Transp., 477 
F.3d 105, 111 (3d Cir. 2007) (“The District Court correctly found that, as an entity, ‘Baker 
clearly had no privacy interest.’ ” (internal brackets omitted)); Crum & Crum Enters. v. 
NDC of Cal., L.P., Civ. No. 09-145 (RBK), 2011 WL 886356, at *3 (D. Del. Mar. 10, 
2011) (“[B]usiness entities do not have a right to privacy.”); Warner-Lambert Co. v. 
Execuquest Corp., 691 N.E.2d 545, 548 (Mass. 1998) (“Cases from other jurisdictions 
unanimously deny a right of privacy to corporations.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
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illuminated, however, we must look beyond formal designations to 
see how the law protects the right against disclosure of information. 
In reality, companies enjoy vigorous protections against 
disclosure of embarrassing information. This Part begins by discussing 
the main legal sources of such privacy by means other than 
constitutional protection. The Part then illustrates the discussion with 
examples of contemporary clashes between this forceful de facto 
corporate privacy and the public interest in detecting and preventing 
harm. 
A. Who Needs the Common Person’s Privacy? Secrecy by Other 
Means 
Notwithstanding the formal absence of a corporate right to 
privacy, companies seeking to keep data from being disclosed can 
invoke claims grounded in property and contract, including trade 
secret claims.50 These protections are so strong that even the rules 
governing disclosure under sunshine laws or discovery in civil 
litigation yield to them.51 For example, the Federal Freedom of 
Information Act (“FOIA”) exempts from disclosure “trade secrets 
and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and 
privileged or confidential.”52 In civil litigation, Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 26(c)(1)(G) allows parties facing discovery requests to 
move for a protective order “to protect a party or person from 
annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, 
 
TORTS § 652I cmt. c (AM. LAW. INST. 1977) (“A corporation . . . has no personal right of 
privacy.”). 
 50. See, e.g., Tavoulareas v. Wash. Post Co., 724 F.2d 1010, 1029 (D.C. Cir.) (holding 
that Mobil Oil Corp’s privacy interests in sensitive commercial information overcame the 
presumption of openness in discovery and defeated the Washington Post’s discovery 
requests in litigation), vacated on other grounds, 737 F.2d 1170, 1017–25 (D.C. Cir. 1984) 
(en banc) (per curiam); Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 709, 
715 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that information on potentially defective tires was not 
subject to disclosure even though potentially necessary to the case of injured plaintiffs 
because of trade secret protections); State ex rel. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs v. Ohio 
Envtl. Prot. Agency, 724 N.E.2d 411, 417–20 (Ohio 2000) (holding that trade secret 
protection precluded disclosure of city landfill operator’s data on waste generators, 
relative amounts of waste generated, whether certain generators’ wastes failed tests more 
often, and whether a waste generator’s chemicals had to be mixed longer to be properly 
treated for disposal). 
 51. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2012) (exempting from FOIA requirements, “trade 
secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or 
confidential”); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(G) (authorizing courts to prohibit discovery of “a 
trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information”); 
MASS. R. CIV. P. 26(c) (similar); MICH. CT. R. 2.302(c)(8) (similar); PA. R. CIV. P. 
4012(a)(9) (similar). 
 52. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). 
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including . . . requiring that a trade secret or other confidential 
research, development, or commercial information not be revealed or 
be revealed only in a specified way.”53 Numerous states have identical 
or nearly identical provisions in their rules governing civil discovery.54 
A trade secret is nonpublic information that is the subject of 
reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy and that confers a business 
advantage over competitors who lack that information.55 Such 
information can include formulas, processes, technical know-how, 
compilations of vital business information, and similar kinds of secret 
knowledge.56 The aims of trade secret protection are to foster healthy 
competition, reduce the need for companies to pursue extensive self-
help security precautions, and encourage innovation.57 
To be a trade secret, the information need not be novel or 
original as with a patent or copyright, but it must be both kept secret 
and valuable because it is secret.58 In contrast, the inventor of a 
patentable material must disclose the art—the novel idea—to gain 
protection because “the ultimate goal of the patent system is to bring 
new designs and technologies into the public domain through 
disclosure.”59 Unlike patents, which are time limited, trade secrets 
may indefinitely deprive the public of information.60 
There is a vigorous debate over whether a trade secret is a form 
of property.61 Traditionally, the central concern of trade secret 
protection is the breach of a confidence by revelation of a secret.62 As 
 
 53. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(G). 
 54. E.g., FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.280(c)(7); IOWA CT. R. 1.504(7); MASS R. CIV. P. 26(c); 
MICH. CT. R. 2.302(c)(8); MINN. R. CIV. P. 26.03(g); MISS. R. CIV. P. 26(d)(7); OHIO R. 
CIV. P. 26(C); OR. R. CIV. P. 36(C)(7); PA. R. CIV. P. 4012(a)(9); WASH. CT. R. 26(c)(7). 
 55. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985). 
 56. Id.; see also, e.g., John C. Stedman, Trade Secrets, 23 OHIO ST. L.J. 4, 5–6 (1962) 
(listing and discussing examples and the broad swath of information that might constitute 
trade secrets). 
 57. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 485 (1974). 
 58. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985); SCHEPPELE, 
supra note 9, at 232–40. 
 59. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151–52 (1989). 
 60. See, e.g., Andrew A. Schwartz, The Corporate Preference for a Trade Secret, 74 
OHIO ST. L.J. 623, 648–50 (2013) (discussing how the perpetual nature of trade secrets and 
the lack of requirement to disclose should lead companies to prefer trade secret over 
patent protection). 
 61. See, e.g., SCHEPPELE, supra note 9, at 240 (“A number of cases have indicated that 
it is breach of confidence, rather than any property theory, that underlies the decisions in 
these cases.”); Michael Risch, Why Do We Have Trade Secrets?, 11 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. 
L. REV. 1, 16 (2007) (“[T]he question of whether or not trade secrets are property has 
raged on for many years.”). 
 62. See, e.g., DuPont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917) 
(Holmes, J.) (“Whether the plaintiffs have any valuable secret or not the defendant knows 
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Justice Holmes wrote for the Supreme Court: “the starting point . . . is 
not property or due process of law, but that the defendant stood in 
confidential relations with the plaintiffs” and “fraudulently abuse[d] 
the trust” by disclosure of a secret.63 Breach of confidence is a concept 
that draws on principles of contract, tort, and privacy rather than 
property.64 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has held that trade 
secrets are a form of intangible property.65 Most states also accord 
trade secrets property protection.66 
The debate over the legal heritage of trade secrets is not just 
academic. The issue has a practical impact in litigation. For example, 
Monsanto Company argued all the way to the Supreme Court that 
health and safety disclosures required under the Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act67 (“FIFRA”) would reveal trade 
secrets and thereby constitute an unconstitutional governmental 
taking of property.68 The Supreme Court agreed, ruling that the data 
the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) sought were trade 
secrets and a form of intangible property implicating the Fifth 
Amendment’s protections against takings without just 
compensation.69 
Regardless of whether information meets the requirements for 
trade secrets, companies can also create and protect confidential 
information by contract.70 Two main ways to create secrecy by 
 
the facts, whatever they are, through a special confidence that he accepted. The property 
may be denied but the confidence cannot be.”); SCHEPPELE, supra note 9, at 240 (“[T]he 
presence of a confidential relationship can be said to be at the heart of the protection of 
trade secrets.”). 
 63. Masland, 244 U.S. at 102. 
 64. See, e.g., Entm’t Research Grp., Inc. v. Genesis Creative Grp., Inc., 122 F.3d 1211, 
1226–27 (9th Cir. 1997) (discussing the tort of breach of confidence “based upon the 
concept of an implied obligation or contract between the parties that confidential 
information will not be disclosed”); Young v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 882 F.2d 633, 641 (2d 
Cir. 1989) (“[W]hile contract theories may have contributed to the development of the 
breach-of-confidence cause of action, it owes its existence to several doctrines, including 
the right to privacy.”). 
 65. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003–04 (1984) (holding that 
health and safety data are implicated by trade secret protections and that trade secrets are 
a form of intangible property). 
 66. See Philip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 24, 31 (1st Cir. 2002) (en banc) (“In most 
states, trade secrets are property protected by the Takings Clause.”). 
 67. Pub. L. No. 98-201, 97 Stat. 1379 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 136 (2012)). 
 68. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 992–93, 998–99, 1003–04. 
 69. Id. at 1004. Section I.B.1 will further delve into the complexities of Ruckelshaus 
and the Fifth Amendment implications of trade secret disclosure provisions. 
 70. See, e.g., Peter C. Quittmeyer, Trade Secrets and Confidential Information Under 
Georgia Law, 19 GA. L. REV. 623, 624 (1985) (“Complementing trade secrets, 
‘confidential information’ in Georgia may include almost any other business information 
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contract include nondisclosure agreements and settlement 
agreements with nondisclosure provisions.71 The legal protection of 
corporate information comes through enforcement of the contract.72 
Nondisclosure contracts are often used with employees, licensees, 
prospective purchasers, and other companies.73 Such agreements are 
more likely to be time limited because of prohibitions against 
unreasonable restraints of trade and employment that consider how 
long people are prohibited from using their know-how.74 
In contrast, nondisclosure provisions in secret settlements with 
injured plaintiffs may lack any time limit.75 One example of a 
confidentiality clause provides that the parties: 
[E]xpressly understand and agree that this Agreement and its 
contents (including, but not limited to, the fact of payment and 
the amounts to be paid hereunder) shall remain 
CONFIDENTIAL and shall not be disclosed to any third party 
whatsoever, except the Parties’ counsel, accountants, financial 
advisors, tax professionals retained by them, any federal, state, 
or local governmental taxing or regulatory authority, and the 
Parties’ management, officers and Board of Directors, and 
except as required by law or order of court. Any person 
identified in the preceding sentence to whom information 
concerning this Agreement is disclosed is bound by this 
 
of importance, but legal protection of confidential information occurs only through 
enforcement of the express terms of a contractual relationship or, less frequently, the 
implied terms of a confidential relationship.”); Linda K. Stevens, When Should a 
Confidentiality Agreement Contain a Time Limit?, 19 FRANCHISE L.J. 3, 4 (1999) 
(discussing how confidentiality agreements can protect information otherwise not entitled 
to trade secret protection). 
 71. Terry Morehead Dworkin & Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Buying Silence, 36 AM. 
BUS. L.J. 151, 152–53 (1998); Quittmeyer, supra note 70, at 665; Stevens, supra note 70, at 
3–4. 
 72. Quittmeyer, supra note 70, at 665–66. 
 73. Alan E. Garfield, Promises of Silence: Contract Law and Freedom of Speech, 83 
CORNELL L. REV. 261, 301 (1998). 
 74. See, e.g., Thomas v. Best Mfg. Corp., 218 S.E.2d 68, 70 (Ga. 1975) (holding that a 
perpetual nondisclosure agreement is so broad as to be unreasonable); Gary Van Zeeland 
Talent, Inc. v. Sandas, 267 N.W.2d 242, 248–50 (Wis. 1978) (similar); Stevens, supra note 
70, at 4 (advising lawyers to include a time limit in their nondisclosure agreements to avoid 
problems). 
75. Examples of actual secret settlement confidentiality provisions are, for obvious 
reasons, not publicly available. However, model clauses are instructive. See, e.g., LITIG. 
SOLS. LAW GRP., A SAMPLER OF CONFIDENTIALITY CLAUSES FOR INCLUSION IN 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS, http://lslg.com/pdfs/A%20Sampler%20of%20Confidentialit
y%20Clauses_020510.pdf (last modified Feb. 2, 2010) [http://perma.cc/Q8DJ-4J9X]. 
94 N.C. L. REV. 161 (2015) 
176 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94 
confidentiality provision and the disclosing party shall be liable 
for any breaches of confidentiality . . . . 76 
In securing settlements, plaintiffs face powerful pressure to accede to 
blanket secrecy provisions that require silence not only about the 
settlement terms but also the facts of the case.77 
The current rules of discovery in litigation and by the public 
through sunshine laws accommodate this manufactured de facto 
corporate privacy.78 Federal FOIA and most similar state sunshine 
laws flatly exempt “trade secrets and commercial or financial 
information obtained from a person and privileged or 
confidential[.]”79 Notwithstanding the reference to a “person” in the 
provision, the exemption covers information submitted by a wide 
range of entities, including companies.80 By executive order, 
businesses that submit information to federal agencies may claim 
exemption from disclosure by designating such information 
“confidential commercial information” and stating that “disclosure 
could reasonably be expected to cause substantial competitive 
harm.”81 When someone submits a request for such information to the 
government, the owner of the information is entitled to notice to 
defend against release.82 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c)(1)(G) and similar state 
rules are permissive in the sense that they give courts discretion to 
 
 76. JEREMY A. MERCER & EVAN A. BLOCH, SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND 
RELEASE: A U.S. EXAMPLE 4 (2012), http://www.pepperlaw.com/uploads/files/bloche
_settlementagreementandrelease_ausexample_2_503_1929.pdf [http://perma.cc/R4LN-
6QMU]. 
 77. See id. 
 78. See discussion supra notes 50–54. 
 79. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2012); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 10002 (LEXIS 
through 80 Del. Laws, Ch. 193) (stating that “[t]rade secrets and commercial or financial 
information obtained from a person which is of a privileged or confidential nature” is not 
a public record subject to disclosure); OHIO ADMIN. CODE 6121-1-18(C)(4) (West, 
Westlaw through Sept. 30, 2015) (noting that “confidential trade secrets or other 
confidential material . . . are . . . not subject to disclosure to the public”); Theresa M. 
Costonis, Annotation, What Constitutes Commercial or Financial Information, Exclusive of 
Trade Secrets, Exempt from Disclosure Under State Freedom of Information Acts—
General Rules of Construction, 5 A.L.R. 6th 327 (2005) (“Virtually all states have an 
information act and most have an exemption thereto applicable to commercial or financial 
information.”). 
 80. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 551(2) (“ ‘[P]erson’ includes an individual, partnership, 
corporation, association, or public or private organization other than an agency.”); FCC v. 
AT&T, 131 S. Ct. 1177, 1185 (2011) (noting that the provision “clearly applies to 
corporations”). 
 81. Exec. Order No. 12,600, 3 C.F.R. 235, 236 (1987–1988). 
 82. Id. at 237–38. 
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issue a protective order rather than command that such orders issue.83 
The discovery rules are tilted toward preventing embarrassment by 
disclosure, however, by specifying that preventing “embarrassment” 
is a basis to grant a protective order—and not specifying that the need 
to detect and prevent threats to public health or safety is a 
countervailing reason not to grant requests.84 As discussed in the next 
section, companies have successfully claimed these accommodations 
for corporate privacy, locking up information relevant for detecting 
and addressing public health and safety concerns. 
B. Three Contemporary Controversies over Corporate Secrecy and 
Public Health and Safety 
A major aim of protections against disclosure of corporate trade 
secrets or confidential information is to reduce the risk of 
“annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or 
expense.”85 Implicit in these goals is the reduction of unwarranted 
embarrassment and other costs—though not all embarrassment or 
other costs—that are inherent in the discovery process.86 The 
challenge is determining how and where to strike the balance when 
the public benefit outweighs the costs and imposition upon private 
interests. As discussed below, controversies have flared when 
companies wield robust protections for corporate privacy to ward off 
attempts to investigate potential public health and safety concerns. 
Sometimes the disclosure battle is over whether 
nongovernmental actors may have access to information required by 
law to be reported to governmental agencies.87 Sometimes the battle 
 
 83. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(G) (stating courts “may, for good cause,” issue such an 
order). 
 84. Id. (stating courts may “issue an order to protect a party or person 
from . . . embarrassment”). This omission contrasts with more progressive state provisions 
such as California Evidence Code section 1060, which provides that “the owner of a trade 
secret has a privilege to refuse to disclose the secret, and to prevent another from 
disclosing it, if the allowance of the privilege will not tend to conceal fraud or otherwise 
work injustice.” CAL. EVID. CODE § 1060 (West, Westlaw through ch. 807 of 2015 Reg. 
Sess. & Ch. 1 of 2015–2016 2d Ex. Sess.). 
 85. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1) (emphasis added). 
 86. See, e.g., Knoettgen v. Superior Court, 273 Cal. Rptr. 636, 638 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) 
(“In all forms of discovery . . . witnesses are afforded statutory protection from 
unwarranted intrusiveness, annoyance, embarrassment, and oppression.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 87. See, e.g., Masonite Corp. v. Cty. of Mendocino Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 49 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 639, 648 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (upholding a company’s objection to public 
disclosure of information regarding air emissions “factors” required to be reported to 
county air management regulators); State ex rel. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs v. Ohio Envtl. 
Prot. Agency, 724 N.E.2d 411, 417–20 (Ohio 2000) (refusing to order public disclosure of 
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is over whether a corporation has to disclose such information to 
government regulators.88 And sometimes the battle is over mandated 
disclosure directly to consumers.89 Three contemporary controversies 
illustrate this clash: nondisclosure of potentially hazardous or toxic 
product components, secret settlements, and nondisclosure of drug 
counterfeiting information. 
1.  Privacy by Trade Secret: Hiding Potential Hazards 
Companies fighting against having to disclose information about 
potentially hazardous ingredients, product defects, toxic emissions, 
and other potential public harms frequently claim that the 
information sought is a trade secret.90 For example, when 
Bridgestone/Firestone Tire Company faced lawsuits across the 
country for deaths due to separating tires leading to car crashes, the 
company successfully used claims of trade secret to ward off attempts 
to obtain discovery of the rubber formula used in the tires.91 Though 
the formula was relevant to the case brought by bereaved relatives 
and crash survivors, courts refused to allow its discovery, holding that, 
 
data submitted by hazardous-waste landfill operator to state environmental protection 
agency). 
 88. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 998–99, 1003–04 (1984) 
(considering claim that disclosures required under federal law to the EPA would reveal 
trade secrets and violate the takings clause); Philip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 24, 26, 
28–31 (1st Cir. 2002) (en banc) (invalidating a Massachusetts law requiring disclosure of 
ingredient lists for all cigarette, snuff, and chewing tobacco products sold in the state and 
allowing for disclosure of such information whenever disclosure “could reduce risks to 
public health”); Jaymar-Ruby, Inc. v. FTC, 496 F. Supp. 838, 845 (N.D. Ind. 1980) 
(considering claim by corporation that disclosure to state law enforcement agency would 
constitute a Fifth Amendment taking of a trade secret). 
 89. See, e.g., Me. Educ. Ass’n Benefits Tr. v. Cioppa, 695 F.3d 145, 149–50 (1st Cir. 
2012) (considering claim by trust that a state law requiring health insurers to disclose 
aggregate loss information would reveal a trade secret and be an uncompensated taking in 
violation of the Fifth Amendment); Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n v. Rowe, 429 F.3d 294, 305–
06 (1st Cir. 2005) (arguing that statute mandating that pharmaceutical companies disclose 
to customers information regarding discounts and other contract terms requires 
disclosures of trade secrets and constitutes a regulatory taking without just compensation). 
 90. E.g., Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1003–06; Cioppa, 695 F.3d at 149; Pharm. Care 
Mgmt. Ass’n, 429 F.3d at 305–06; Philip Morris, Inc., 312 F.3d at 28–31; Masonite Corp., 49 
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 648; Bridgestone Ams. Holding, Inc. v. Mayberry, 878 N.E.2d 189, 193 
(Ind. 2007); Am. Tobacco Co. v. Evans, 508 So.2d 1057, 1061 (Miss. 1987); State ex rel. 
Lucas Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 724 N.E.2d at 417–20; Crum v. Bridgestone/Firestone N. Am. 
Tire, LLC, 907 A.2d 578, 584 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006); In re Cont’l Gen. Tire, Inc., 979 S.W.2d 
609, 612 (Tex. 1998). 
 91. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 709, 715 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1992); Mayberry, 878 N.E.2d at 196–97; Crum, 907 A.2d at 588. For a history of the 
Bridgestone Tire controversy and the pattern of deaths hidden for years while deaths 
continued to accumulate, see Keith Bradsher, S.U.V. Tire Defects Were Known in ‘96 but 
Not Reported, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2001, at A1. 
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to access the information, the plaintiffs had to meet the high burden 
of showing that it was necessary to prove their case.92 
The solicitude for trade secrets was so strong that it even 
trumped the interest of crash survivors in the more progressive 
jurisdiction of California.93 California law limits protection of trade 
secrets in discovery only where it “will not tend to . . . work 
injustice.”94 The California Court of Appeals ruled that preventing 
discovery of a trade secret “may not be deemed to ‘work 
injustice’ . . . simply because it would protect information generally 
relevant to the subject matter of an action or helpful to preparation of 
a case.”95 Rather, like courts in other jurisdictions, the California 
court required the person seeking the evidence to make a prima facie 
case that “the information sought is essential to a fair resolution of 
the lawsuit” and “necessary to the proof of, or defense against, a 
material element” of the cause of action.96 Even though the accident 
survivors in the case submitted an expert declaration that the 
chemical recipe for the tire would help them determine why the tire 
failed, the court found this need insufficient to meet the high bar.97 
The court reasoned that the expert did not specify how the formulas 
were necessary for him to reach conclusions and noted that, in 
another case, he drew conclusions without access to formula 
information.98 
Even where the law requires disclosure, companies have raised 
Fifth Amendment takings clause challenges against it.99 The landmark 
case in this area is the Supreme Court’s decision in Ruckelshaus v. 
Monsanto Co.100 Ruckelshaus concerned the constitutionality of 
disclosures of health, safety, and environmental data submitted to the 
EPA by companies seeking to register pesticide products for sale.101 
 
 92. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 716; Mayberry, 878 N.E.2d at 196–
97; Crum, 907 A.2d at 588. 
 93. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 715. 
 94. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1060 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 807 of 2015 Reg. Sess. & 
Ch. 1 of 2d Ex. Sess.). 
 95. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 712. 
 96. Id. at 713. 
 97. Id. at 716. 
 98. Id. 
 99. E.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003–06 (1984); Me. Educ. Ass’n 
Benefits Tr. v. Cioppa, 695 F.3d 145, 148 (1st. Cir 2012); Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n v. 
Rowe, 429 F.3d 294, 305–06 (1st Cir. 2005); Philip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 24, 28–31 
(1st Cir. 2002); id. at 48, 51 (Selya, J., concurring). 
 100. 467 U.S. 986 (1984). 
 101. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1000–01. 
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To understand the complex holding of the case, it is important to 
understand its statutory context. The statutory regime at issue was 
FIFRA.102 Before amendments in 1972, FIFRA did not have 
provisions regarding the authorized use and disclosure of data 
submitted by pesticide companies in connection with their product 
registrations.103 In 1972, however, Congress amended FIFRA.104 The 
1972 amendments added a new provision governing public disclosure 
of data, including a provision that prohibited the EPA from publicly 
disclosing data that related to “trade secrets or commercial or 
financial information[.]”105 Heavy litigation followed over several 
provisions left unclear after the 1972 amendments.106 In 1978, 
Congress enacted new legislation, again amending FIFRA, including 
revisions to the data disclosure provisions.107 The 1978 amendment 
added a new provision requiring disclosure of all health, safety, and 
environmental data even if the company claimed the information was 
a trade secret.108 
Chemical and agricultural products company Monsanto sued, 
challenging the provision requiring disclosure of health, safety, and 
environmental data.109 The Supreme Court ruled that a trade secret is 
a form of intangible property protected by the takings clause of the 
Fifth Amendment.110 The more complex question was whether 
disclosure of the data constituted a taking.111 
Generally, analysis of whether a taking has occurred is fact 
dependent and ad hoc.112 A court examines the question of whether 
regulation has gone too far and become a taking in light of several 
factors, including “the character of the governmental action, its 
economic impact, and its interference with reasonable investment-
 
 102. Id. at 990 (construing Pub. L. No. 98-201, 97 Stat. 1379 (codified as amended at 7 
U.S.C. § 136 (2012)). 
 103. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1008. 
 104. Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-516, 86 Stat. 
973 (1972). 
 105. Id. § 10(b), 86 Stat. at 989. 
 106. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 993–95. 
 107. Federal Pesticide Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-396, 92 Stat. 819 (codified at 7 
U.S.C. § 136(h)(d) (2012)). 
 108. Id. § 15(2)(d)(1) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 136h(d) (1982)). The provision has been 
amended yet again and no longer allows for disclosure of health, safety, and 
environmental data to qualified requesters notwithstanding claims of trade secrets as it did 
under the 1978 amendment. See Federal Pesticide Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-396, 92 Stat. 
819 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 136h(d) (2012)). 
 109. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 998. 
 110. Id. at 1003–04. 
 111. Id. at 1004. 
 112. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979). 
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backed expectations.”113 Thus, interference with investment-backed 
expectations—beyond mere impingement on a “unilateral 
expectation or an abstract need”—is one of several factors weighing 
in favor of finding a taking.114 
Rather than examining all the factors, however, the Ruckelshaus 
Court found that just one factor—reasonable investment-backed 
expectations—was “so overwhelming” that it was dispositive.115 The 
Court held that between 1972 and 1978, when FIFRA expressly 
forbade disclosure of trade secrets, Monsanto had a reasonable 
investment-backed expectation of nondisclosure predicated on that 
explicit statutory assurance.116 Monsanto could therefore claim a 
taking if the EPA then publicly disclosed the information, upsetting 
Monsanto’s expectations of continuing control and power to exclude 
others from knowledge of the data.117 
In contrast, the Court ruled that after 1978, when FIFRA was 
amended to announce that health, safety, and environmental 
information was subject to public disclosure, Monsanto could have no 
reasonable investment-backed expectation of confidentiality.118 While 
it is true that disclosure was the price of registration of a pesticide, 
“such restrictions are the burdens we all must bear in exchange for 
‘the advantage of living and doing business in a civilized 
community.’ ”119 Even before 1972, when FIFRA was simply silent 
about disclosure, Monsanto had no reasonable expectation of 
confidentiality.120 As a company in an industry that “long has been the 
focus of great public concern and significant government regulation,” 
it was likely that the government would find disclosure to be in the 
public interest.121 
While Ruckelshaus seemed to have struck a balance, allowing 
public disclosure where a regulatory law gives notice and dispels 
investment-backed expectations of confidentiality, the lower courts 
continue to wrestle with takings clause challenges to disclosure 
laws.122 The First Circuit’s en banc decision in Philip Morris, Inc. v. 
 
 113. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980). 
 114. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1005–06. 
 115. Id. at 1005. 
 116. Id. at 1011. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 1006. 
 119. Id. at 1007 (quoting Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 67 (1979)). 
 120. Id. at 1008. 
 121. Id. at 1009. 
 122. See, e.g., Me. Educ. Ass’n Benefits Tr. v. Cioppa, 695 F.3d 145, 148 (1st Cir. 2012); 
Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n v. Rowe, 429 F.3d 294, 305–06 (1st Cir. 2005); Philip Morris, 
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Reilly123 illustrates how strong protections for trade secrets still 
remain notwithstanding Ruckelshaus.124 At issue in Philip Morris was 
the 1996 Massachusetts Disclosure Act, which was enacted out of 
concern that some tobacco product additives worsened health 
consequences and potentially increased nicotine delivery in cigarettes 
marketed as low nicotine.125 Without knowing the identity of tobacco 
product additives, it was hard to investigate the adverse health 
consequences of product interactions or study the impact of additives 
popular in products marketed to younger consumers.126 The law also 
aimed to publicize the ingredient lists of various brands to raise public 
awareness about additives and inform consumer choice.127 
Philip Morris sued, alleging that the ingredients in tobacco 
products are trade secrets and that public disclosure constituted a 
taking without just compensation.128 Writing for the en banc court, 
Judge Torruella proceeded to painstakingly analyze each of the 
myriad factors governing when a regulation becomes a taking rather 
than viewing the investment-backed expectation factor as dispositive, 
as the Supreme Court did in Ruckelshaus.129 The decision drew on the 
Supreme Court’s multi-factor test in Penn Central Transportation Co. 
v. New York City,130 weighing (1) the economic impact of the 
regulation, (2) the interference with reasonable investment-backed 
expectations, and (3) the character of the governmental action.131 
Even though there was no express promise of confidentiality in 
the law, and tobacco is a heavily regulated product, the Philip Morris 
court nonetheless found that the Massachusetts public health law 
interfered with reasonable investment-backed expectations and 
constituted an impermissible taking.132 The court narrowly 
distinguished Ruckelshaus, explaining that it dealt with property 
interests in data already submitted to the EPA whereas Philip Morris 
was refusing to submit data altogether.133 The effect of Philip Morris 
is that once a company complies with a data submission requirement 
 
Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 24, 26, 28–31 (1st Cir. 2002) (en banc); Bridgestone Ams. Holding, 
Inc. v. Mayberry, 878 N.E.2d 189, 193 (Ind. 2007). 
 123. 312 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2002). 
 124. Philip Morris, 312 F.3d at 28–31, 47. 
 125. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94, § 307B (1996); Philip Morris, 312 F.3d at 28. 
 126. Philip Morris, 312 F.3d at 28. 
 127. Id.  
 128. Id. at 30. 
 129. Id. at 35–47; see Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984). 
 130. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
 131. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123–24 (1978). 
 132. Philip Morris, 312 F.3d at 45–46. 
 133. Id. at 38. 
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and gives information to the government it has less ability to 
challenge public disclosure, whereas a company that challenges a law 
at the outset and refuses to disclose data to the government has a 
much greater chance of prevailing.134 
The Philip Morris decision swept even more broadly than just 
cabining Ruckelshaus’s reasoning regarding investment-backed 
expectations. In addition, the Philip Morris court ruled that the 
Disclosure Act “essentially destroys the tobacco companies’ trade 
secrets” and rendered the economic impact of the regulation 
potentially dispositive.135 Even more sweepingly, the decision 
indicated that legislatures seeking to protect public health through 
disclosure regulations must “show more than a possible beneficial 
effect.”136 The Philip Morris court cited less intrusive regulatory 
regimes and concluded that legislatures must demonstrate that 
proposed public health disclosure regimes “further the stated goal of 
promoting public health in such a way as to counterbalance the 
tremendous private loss involved.”137 Philip Morris thus illustrates 
that corporate privacy through trade secret protection remains 
vigorously alive and well in the lower courts after Ruckelshaus, posing 
a roadblock to general public disclosure statutes meant to protect 
health and safety. 
2.  Privacy by Contract: Secret Settlements 
Another powerful way to hide embarrassing information of 
public import is through secret settlements—a recurring controversy 
that tends to erupt into public view belatedly, following rising victim 
counts.138 A settlement is essentially a private contract with provisions 
enforced by courts.139 Settlement of lawsuits for injuries due to 
product defects, toxic emissions, or other public health and safety 
issues using agreements with nondisclosure provisions essentially 
 
 134. See id. at 50 (Selya, J., concurring) (“After all a secret remains a secret when not 
divulged.”). 
 135. Id. at 42 (majority opinion). 
 136. Id. at 44. 
 137. Id. at 45. 
 138. See, e.g., Alison Lothes, Comment, Quality, Not Quantity: An Analysis of 
Confidential Settlements and Litigants’ Economic Incentives, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 433, 433–
35 (2005) (citing numerous examples such as the Catholic Church’s sex-abuse scandal, 
litigation over the Ford Pinto, infertility, deaths due to use of the Dalkon Shield (an 
intrauterine device, or IUD) and more). 
 139. See, e.g., Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 381 (1994) 
(discussing methods to enforce contractual terms in settlement agreements). 
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creates corporate privacy by contract.140 Because casualties are 
concealed by settlement contracts, death and injury counts may rise 
unchecked until the problem becomes too big to hide, erupting into 
national attention. A recent example is the scandal over the use of 
secret settlements by General Motors to conceal from the public 
deaths due to ignition switch defects in several models of its cars.141 
To put the General Motors scandal into its legal and historical 
context, it is helpful to have a brief history of the Transportation 
Recall Enhancement, Accountability, and Documentation Act 
(“TREAD Act”).142 The TREAD Act was birthed in tragedy: the 
deaths of 271 people and injuries of more than 700 others in accidents 
involving Ford Explorer SUVs with defective Bridgestone/Firestone 
tires that suffered tread separation, causing the SUVs to roll over.143 
Congress acted in response to public outrage over Ford Motor 
Company and Bridgestone/Firestone’s failure to report to the 
National Highway Transportation Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) 
numerous lawsuits involving deaths or serious injuries due to 
 
 140. Cf. Richard A. Epstein, The Disclosure Dilemma: Why a Ban on Secret 
Settlements Does More Harm than Good, BOS. GLOBE, Nov. 3, 2002, at D4 (“Secret 
settlements allow both parties to get on with their lives by preserving privacy interests.”). 
 141. Paul M. Barrett, The GM Fiasco and Overuse of Secret Settlements: Four Blunt 
Points, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (June 25, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com
/articles/2014-06-25/the-gm-fiasco-and-the-overuse-of-secret-settlements-four-blunt-points 
[http://perma.cc/5GQ9-9GM5] (discussing the controversy over General Motors’ alleged 
“past policy of secretly settling lawsuits that could have brought defects to public attention 
years before the massive recalls of recent months”); Editorial, Sealed Settlements Could 
Kill: Our View, USA TODAY (Mar. 10, 2014, 7:56 PM), http://www.usatoday.com
/story/opinion/2014/03/10/sealed-settlements-general-motors-priests-bridgestone-firestone-
editorials-debates/6270853/ [http://perma.cc/WXM6-UJWP] (detailing controversy over 
the sealed settlement of a case alleging death due to a General Motors ignition-switch 
defect—nine years before the company finally issued a recall after thirteen deaths 
allegedly due to the defective ignition switches in Chevrolet Cobalt cars); Rep. Nadler 
Introduces Bill To Stop Companies, Like GM, from Hiding Safety Flaws, CONGRESSMAN 
JERROLD NADLER (Apr. 1, 2014), http://nadler.house.gov/press-release/rep-nadler-
introduces-bill-stop-companies-gm-hiding-safety-flaws [hereinafter Nadler Press Release] 
[http://perma.cc/TJX8-QJ35] (discussing proposed legislation, termed the Sunshine in 
Litigation Act, to “prevent companies . . . from concealing evidence of wrongdoing that 
puts our public health and safety at risk” by using confidential settlements “to keep 
lifesaving information from the public”). 
 142. See H.R. REP. NO. 106-954, at 6–7 (2000) (discussing background and need for 
legislation). 
 143. See id.; Kevin M. McDonald, Don’t TREAD on Me: Faster than a Tire Blowout, 
Congress Passes Wide-Sweeping Legislation that Treads on the Thirty-Five Year Old Motor 
Vehicle Safety Act, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 1163, 1163, 1171–79 (2001) (detailing the controversy 
leading to the legislation). 
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defective tires and that the company had recalled its products 
overseas due to crash findings.144 
Moreover, for four years, companies and plaintiffs’ attorneys 
negotiating settlements had kept secret information about a pattern 
of tire failures and consumer deaths and injuries in order to negotiate 
a settlement.145 It took a Houston television station’s report on the 
deaths and serious injuries to alert the public.146 Congressional 
hearings brought even more information to light, including that—
contrary to the public’s assumption that SUVs were safer—SUVs 
were actually more likely to roll over, with some models at 
particularly high risk.147 Like the information about the tire-defect-
related crashes, the information about which SUV models were 
particularly dangerous was locked away in confidential company 
files.148 
The TREAD Act included detailed disclosure requirements to 
NHTSA in hopes of unlocking files containing important public 
health and safety information.149 Vehicle manufacturers must report 
to the government all motor vehicle defects and all incidents of 
serious or fatal crashes linked to a vehicle defect for which the 
manufacturer has received notice.150 The reporting requirements are 
intended to enable more effective government safety surveillance and 
timely recalls.151 The reporting requirements are also backed by civil 
penalties for failure to report and criminal liability for intentional 
misreporting.152 
The luster of the TREAD Act’s surveillance system was 
damaged after revelations of NHTSA inaction despite reports of a 
potential ignition switch defect in Chevrolet Cobalts and Saturn Ions 
manufactured by General Motors.153 The defect, which caused an 
engine and electrical system shut-off and disabled vehicle air bags, 
 
 144. McDonald, supra note 143, at 1163, 1171–79. 
 145. Bradsher, supra note 91, at A1. 
 146. FUNG ET AL., supra note 26, at 1–2. 
 147. Id. at 2. 
 148. Id. 
 149. See 49 U.S.C. § 30166(e)–(m) (2012). 
 150. Id. § 30166(m). 
 151. See McDonald, supra note 143, at 1185–86.  
 152. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 30165(a), 30170(a)(1) (2012). 
 153. MAJORITY STAFF OF H. COMM. ON ENERGY & COMMERCE, STAFF REPORT ON 
THE GM IGNITION SWITCH RECALL: REVIEW OF NHTSA, at 1–2 (2014), 
http://energycommerce.house.gov/sites/republicans.energycommerce.house.gov/files/Heari
ngs/OI/20140915GMFootnotes/NHTSAreportfinal.pdf [http://perma.cc/BZ2E-P3Q2] 
[hereinafter REVIEW OF NHTSA]; Christopher Jensen, In G.M. Recalls, Inaction and Trail 
of Fatal Crashes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2014, at B1. 
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was linked to at least 35 and allegedly as many as 153 deaths.154 It was 
not until 2014 that General Motors issued a recall amid controversy 
over why the company and NHTSA had not acted sooner.155 
The controversy and delay in the public being alerted also has re-
ignited concern over “secret settlements” in which claimants alleging 
injury or death due to defects are paid in settlements placed under 
protective order to prevent disclosure.156 The public outcry has 
prompted the reintroduction of legislation to curb settlement secrecy 
in cases involving issues of public health or safety.157 The proposed 
legislation would forbid courts from entering protective orders or 
approving settlement agreements that would restrict disclosure of 
information “relevant to the protection of public health or safety.”158 
The most recently introduced version of the bill contains an exception 
where “the public interest in the disclosure of past, present, or 
potential health or safety hazards is outweighed by a specific and 
substantial interest in maintaining the confidentiality of the 
information or records in question” and the protection “is no broader 
than necessary to protect the confidentiality interest asserted.”159 As 
Rep. Jerrold Nadler, the sponsor of one of the bills, explained, the 
legislation is aimed at “prevent[ing] companies . . . from concealing 
evidence of wrongdoing that puts our public health and safety at risk” 
 
 154. Tribune Staff, Death Toll Rises to 35 in Faulty GM Ignition Switch Claims, CHI. 
TRIB. (Nov. 24, 2014, 2:14 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/classified/automotive/chi-
gm-ignition-switch-deaths-20141124-story.html [http://perma.cc/8FNG-AMWN]; Jensen, 
supra note 153, at B1; Ben Klayman, Deaths Linked to GM Ignition-Switch Defect Rise to 
23, REUTERS (Sept. 29, 2014, 10:13 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/29/us-gm-
recall-compensation-idUSKCN0HO1F220140929 [http://perma.cc/752G-4QUQ] (stating 
that 153 death claims had been reported). 
 155. REVIEW OF NHTSA, supra note 153, at 1–2; Jensen, supra note 153, at B1. 
 156. See, e.g., Barrett, supra note 141 (discussing General Motors controversy); 
Editorial, Secrecy that Kills, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2014, at SR10 (detailing congressional 
investigation into the General Motors scandal). 
 157. Sunshine in Litigation Act of 2014, S. 2364, 113th Cong. (introduced May 20, 
2014) (endeavoring to prohibit courts from restricting access to information “relevant to 
the protection of public health or safety” by sealing such information in court records, 
ordering nondisclosure of such information obtained in discovery, or approving such 
restrictions in settlement agreements); Safety Over Secrecy Act of 2014, S. 2317, 113th 
Cong. (introduced May 12, 2014) (endeavoring to prohibit courts from approving 
confidential settlements that seal information relating to “protecting the public from a 
hazard to public safety or health”); Sunshine in Litigation Act of 2014, H.R. 4361, 113th 
Cong. (introduced Apr. 1, 2014) (prescribing protections similar to Senate Bill 2364). 
 158. S. 2364 sec. 2, § 1660(a)(1); H.R. 4361 sec. 2, § 1660(a)(1); see also S. 2317 sec. 2, § 
1660(b)(1)(A) (slightly different language).  
 159. S. 2364 sec. 2, § 1660(a)(1)(B). 
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by using confidential settlements “to keep lifesaving information from 
the public.”160 
While the General Motors scandal has given the settlement 
sunshine legislation new momentum, the legislation is likely to face 
the same powerful opposition that killed prior such legislation in 
2008,161 2009,162 2010,163 and 2011.164 In 2011, similar legislation 
emerged from the Senate Judiciary Committee with bipartisan 
support—only to die under intense fire from the business community 
concerned about the consequences of public disclosure of such 
settlements.165 Absent such legislative intervention, the creation of 
secrecy by contract remains unchecked. 
3.  Privacy by “Proprietary Data”: Counterfeit Drugs 
Claiming that data are “proprietary” is a third way to create 
corporate privacy. As a case study of this approach, consider the case 
of counterfeit drugs. Dubbed “medicrime” for short,166 the social costs 
of counterfeiting drugs or creating poor-quality substitutes go beyond 
intellectual property offenses. People have died after ingesting 
contaminated counterfeit medicines or from taking what they thought 
were prophylactic or treatment drugs that were actually fakes, leaving 
them unprotected or untreated.167 Hospitalization and deaths have 
 
 160. Nadler Press Release, supra note 141. 
 161. Sunshine in Litigation Act of 2008, H.R. 5884, 110th Cong. (introduced Apr. 23, 
2008). 
 162. Sunshine in Litigation Act of 2009, H.R. 1508, 111th Cong. (introduced Mar. 12, 
2009). 
 163. Sunshine in Litigation Act of 2010, H.R. 5419, 111th Cong. (introduced May 26, 
2010). 
 164. Sunshine in Litigation Act of 2011, H.R. 592, 112th Cong. (introduced Feb. 9, 
2011). 
 165. See Barrett, supra note 141. 
 166. See Council of Europe, Convention on the Counterfeiting of Medical Products 
and Similar Crimes Involving Threats to Public Health, opened for signature Oct. 28, 2011, 
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criminalize drug counterfeiting and related public health crimes). 
 167. See, e.g., Kristina M. Lybecker, Rx Roulette: Combatting Counterfeit 
Pharmaceuticals in Developing Nations, 28 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 509, 510 
(2007) (summarizing infamous cases, such as the deaths of more than 2,500 people 
vaccinated with counterfeit anti-meningitis drugs during a meningitis outbreak); Paul N. 
Newton et al., Manslaughter by Fake Artesunate in Asia—Will Africa Be Next?, 3 PLOS 
MED. e197, 0752–55 (2006) (discussing problems with counterfeit anti-malarial drugs 
plaguing Asia and a case of a death due to treatment with counterfeit drugs); Rachel 
Ehrenberg, Counterfeit Crackdown: New Scientific Tools Help Tell Fake Meds from the 
Real Thing, SCI. NEWS, June 18, 2011, at 22–24 (discussing how more than fifty Nigerian 
children died after taking contaminated counterfeit teething medicine and the death of a 
twenty-two-year-old Argentinian woman after receiving an injection of counterfeit iron); 
Lindsay Kines, Counterfeit Pills Kill B.C. Woman; Internet Site Linked to Death: Coroner, 
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even ensued from seemingly less serious counterfeiting of pleasure-
enhancing drugs taken for erectile dysfunction, such as Cialis.168 
Because law enforcement resources to combat the spread of 
counterfeit medicines are stretched thin or missing in the areas of 
greatest risk, private actors, particularly major drug companies, play 
critical investigative and enforcement roles.169 Pharmaceutical 
companies use private investigators to detect and try to shut down 
counterfeiting enterprises.170 Recognizing the need to have the 
expertise of major drug companies in investigating and securing 
prosecution of counterfeiters, the World Health Organization 
(“WHO”) even gave large pharmaceutical companies seats on its 
International Medical Products Anti-Counterfeiting Task Force, the 
largest anti-counterfeiting working group, despite outcry from smaller 
generic manufacturers.171 In addition, the security departments of 
twenty-five major pharmaceutical companies run the nonprofit 
Pharmaceutical Security Institute and its private, secure database 
containing member reports of fake drugs and packaging.172 
The pharmaceutical companies view the database as proprietary 
and confidential and do not release the information to researchers—
and perhaps not even to the WHO or other intergovernmental or 
governmental organizations.173 Without access to the databases, 
researchers are unable to identify and study drugs vulnerable to 
counterfeiting. While private companies certainly have an interest in 
shutting down entities they view as counterfeiters, this is 
counterbalanced against their interest in keeping matters quiet so that 
the public is not alerted and does not lose trust in the brand.174 The 
 
EDMONTON J., July 6, 2007, at A5 (reporting on the death of a fifty-eight-year-old woman 
who died from a toxic overload of metals after ingesting counterfeit pills she bought 
online). 
 168. Neil Campbell et al., Internet-Ordered Viagra (Sildenal Citrate) Is Rarely Genuine, 
9 J. SEXUAL MED. 2943, 2947 (2012) (discussing findings regarding counterfeit Viagra); 
Shih Ling Kao et al., Letter to the Editor, An Unusual Outbreak of Hypoglycemia, 360 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 734, 734–35 (2009). 
 169. INST. OF MED., COUNTERING THE PROBLEM OF FALSIFIED AND SUBSTANDARD 
DRUGS 16 (Gilliam J. Buckley & Lawrence O. Gostin eds., 2013); Cockburn et al., supra 
note 11, at 0303. 
 170. Cockburn et al., supra note 11, at 0303. 
 171. See INST. OF MED., supra note 169, at 16. 
 172. Id. at 86–87. 
 173. Cockburn et al., supra note 11, at 0303–05. Cockburn et al. questioned the 
database keepers about release of information to the WHO and governmental authorities 
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and confidential. Id. 
 174. Id. at 0303. 
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secrecy impedes the ability to conduct independent checks and 
scrutiny. 
Concern over the adulteration of medicines has existed as long as 
medicinal use.175 Harmful medicines exist because of a range of 
misconduct, from passing off a drug as made by another 
manufacturer, to adulterating medicines, to a combination of these 
misbehaviors or otherwise producing substandard drugs.176 One 
common distinction in usage today is between counterfeit drugs—
referring to drugs falsified as to source, identity, or both—and 
substandard drugs that fail to meet specifications, for example, by 
having the wrong concentration of active ingredients.177 The problem 
is intensifying in modern times, however, because of the ease of mass 
manufacturing knock-offs, globalization of supply chains, and the rise 
of Internet pharmacies.178 
While the regions hardest hit by the use problems also tend to be 
in developing parts of the world, the problem is not just a poor-
country or developing-world issue.179 With the rise of global trade, 
Internet pharmacies, and the lucrative nature of producing fake or 
substandard drugs for sale, officials in countries like the United 
States, Canada, Britain, and other European Union nations are 
expressing concern.180 Counterfeit Viagra, Ritalin, antibiotics, and 
other drugs have been in circulation in the United States.181 
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Alarmed that criminal enterprises are sending bad medicines 
across borders into Europe, the Council of Europe drafted the first 
international treaty on counterfeit medicines and related crimes—
dubbed the “MEDICRIME Convention”—which opened for 
signature in October 2011.182 The Convention requires signatories to 
criminalize manufacturing, supplying, or trafficking in counterfeit 
medicines and to share data for law enforcement purposes.183 There 
are forty-seven European nations represented by the Council of 
Europe.184 In addition, in 2010, the Ministers of the Council of Europe 
asked that the Convention be circulated widely with an invitation to 
nonmember states to join.185 To date, however, only nineteen nations 
have signed the Convention.186 
While prominent stories about and seizures of counterfeit drugs 
may rouse periodic attention, sustained attention and research is 
difficult because of the scarcity of data on the issue.187 Data on the 
scope of the problem are difficult to obtain because of the covert 
nature of the illicit industry and severe underreporting, particularly in 
the hardest-hit regions of the world.188 Making matters worse, 
medicines are taken by the ill, elderly, and infirm.189 Even when 
people sicken or die because of taking counterfeit or substandard 
drugs, they may not realize it is because of the drug rather than the 
illness.190 As Valerio Reggi, coordinator of the WHO anti-
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counterfeiting taskforce explained, “It’s difficult to link a dead body 
to a counterfeit drug bought at a street market.”191 Because of the 
difficulty in measuring the trade in false pharmaceuticals and linking 
deaths and illnesses to fake drugs, the Institute of Medicine recently 
concluded: “Deaths from fake drugs go largely uncounted, to say 
nothing of the excess morbidity and the time and money wasted by 
using them.”192 
Despite the difficulty in obtaining data, there have been attempts 
to estimate the prevalence of counterfeit medicine; unsurprisingly, 
these numbers vary widely because of the data deficit. Estimates 
indicate that from 10% to over 50% of medicines in some parts of the 
developing world are counterfeit.193 Though the WHO estimated in 
2006 that the prevalence in upper-income countries like the United 
States, Canada, and members of the European Union is less than 1% 
of the drug supply,194 there are indications that sales of counterfeit 
medicines may be growing because of the rise of Internet pharmacies 
and other gray and black markets.195 Because of the scarcity of studies 
on prevalence, many of the estimates of the magnitude of the 
problem have relied on “gray literature” such as media reports of 
cases that have surfaced or litigation documents.196 
Field surveys that systematically and randomly sample and test 
medicines from a representative cross section of a region’s or a 
country’s markets offer the best estimates of the scope of the drug-
supply problem.197 Such field surveys are difficult and potentially 
prohibitively expensive to undertake, however, particularly in the 
hardest-hit low- and middle-income nations with a large, 
heterogeneous pool of gray markets.198 Only recently have attempts 
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been made to systematically quantify the prevalence of counterfeit 
drugs. In 2011, the Promoting the Quality of Medicines program, 
funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development launched 
its Medicines Quality Database (“MQDB”).199 Overseen by the U.S. 
Pharmacopeial Convention, the database is a valuable development 
because it allows access to data from participating countries on 
samples of medicines tested pursuant to standardized guidelines to 
enhance quality, validity, reliability, and comparability of the data 
obtained.200 There are currently twelve participating countries, 
contributing more than 12,500 records of drug tests in total.201 The 
four longest-participating countries are Cambodia,202 Laos,203 
Vietnam,204 and Thailand.205 While a promising start, the coverage 
remains limited. Private partners are important in expanding the web 
of surveillance—but effective surveillance is stymied by the veil of 
secrecy surrounding counterfeiting information uncovered by 
companies with the resources and expertise to investigate.206 
II.  WHY A CONSUMER-ORIENTED GENERAL DISCLOSURE MODEL 
IS NOT ENOUGH 
While corporate secrecy that stifles public protection is a 
problem, general public disclosure is not a feasible cure in the 
sensitive contexts where companies claim rights to corporate privacy 
secured by trade secret, contract, or property law.207 As discussed in 
Part I, some courts have held that general disclosure of protected 
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trade secrets—even to protect public health and safety—is an 
unconstitutional taking of property without compensation in violation 
of the Fifth Amendment.208 Secret settlement agreements have been 
routinely sanctioned by courts despite recurring controversy and 
repeated congressional efforts to prohibit judicial sanction of 
contracts preventing disclosure of information important to public 
health and safety.209 
Moreover, even where general disclosure might be an option, it 
may not be the most effective way when balancing the costs of 
disclosure with the benefits. This Part begins by discussing the 
ascendant consumer-oriented approach to disclosure. The Part then 
turns to why piling more disclosures on information-overloaded, 
nonexpert consumers is not the most effective solution for the 
private-data, public-safety conflict. 
A. Consumer, Protect Thyself 
In numerous contexts, from wastewater contamination to 
financial disclosure laws, legislatures have enacted targeted 
transparency regimes with disclosure as a centerpiece of efforts to 
enable better protection.210 Two major aims of disclosure as a tool to 
protect public health and safety include enabling informed consumer 
choice and allowing consumers to self-protect to prevent harm.211 A 
major assumption and goal of mandatory disclosure is a better-
informed individual decision maker, who Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl 
E. Schneider dub “Chris Consumer.”212 
Mandated disclosure works well for Chris Consumer when 
information is stripped down and rendered into an accessible 
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decisional heuristic.213 An excellent example is the TREAD Act’s 
savvy strategy of giving consumers digestible vehicle roll-over safety 
information through a five-star rating system based on government 
crash tests.214 The five-star crash rating system enables consumers to 
exercise better-informed choice, rendering complex government 
crash-test results an accessible decisional heuristic.215 Such disclosure 
effectively enables informed consumption in light of known public 
health and safety information with technical details removed. 
Mandated disclosure is also used to facilitate consumer self-
protection. Data breach notification laws are an example. The laws 
generally require businesses and governmental entities holding 
personally identifiable information, such as account or credit card 
numbers, to notify individuals when there is a breach involving 
unauthorized access to such information.216 The aim of data breach 
disclosure laws is to alert individuals so they can self-protect and 
minimize damage from crimes such as identity theft.217 
A thicket of data breach notification laws has rapidly grown and 
spread since California enacted the nation’s first data breach 
disclosure law in 2002.218 Today, forty-seven states, the District of 
Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands all have 
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data breach notification laws.219 Congress is also considering 
numerous proposals for a federal data breach notification law to 
standardize the obligations that companies face and enable 
consumers to better self-protect.220 
Companies operating in the United States currently face a 
daunting patchwork of data breach notification laws.221 The laws 
differ in several ways, including on (1) the definition of the time 
period in which businesses have to notify consumers of a data breach 
affecting them; (2) whether failure to notify results in civil or criminal 
penalties and what those penalties are; (3) whether the people 
affected have a private right of action; (4) whether access to 
encrypted data is exempt; and (5) whether immaterial breaches are 
exempt from disclosure and how to define them. The need to 
harmonize state laws and recent, high-profile, large data breaches at 
businesses such as Target, Home Depot, Sony, and JPMorgan have 
spurred efforts toward a federal data breach law.222 The content of 
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such a law is hotly contested, however, stalling efforts to enact a 
federal data breach notification law for nearly a decade.223 
Companies disagree among themselves about what the content 
of data breach notification laws should be, depending on the industry 
sector. For example, the entity representing federal credit unions is 
advocating mandatory “disclosure of identities of companies and 
merchants whose data systems have been violated so consumers are 
aware of those that place their personal information at risk.”224 This 
desire for identification—and the incentives to improve that come 
from identification—stem from concern that credit unions and other 
financial institutions bear the brunt of the costs of helping consumers 
after data breaches of retailers’ systems, such as issuing new cards, 
replacing stolen funds, and dealing with the greater volume of 
customer service needs.225 A federal credit union representative 
expressed concern that, while financial institutions pay the costs, 
“[t]he negligent entity that caused these expenses by failing to protect 
consumer data loses nothing, and is often undisclosed to the 
consumer.”226 
Other industry executives argue that data breaches can be 
quietly addressed without alarming consumers and drawing negative 
publicity in cases where data was accessed but not stolen, or stolen 
but not used.227 Some business leaders also express concern that 
revealing a breach alerts other hackers to exploitable weaknesses.228 
A third cluster of arguments centers around cyberattacks by nation-
states through their intelligence agents on companies with sensitive 
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national security or intellectual property information.229 Because such 
attacks are aimed at obtaining national security- or national 
competitiveness-related information, the materiality for everyday 
consumers may be lessened and is counterbalanced by the sensitivity 
of the information for covert investigation and foreign relations 
purposes.230 These arguments highlight a larger concern with 
mandated disclosure—that information would be better utilized by 
experts and may even prove counterproductive if generally released. 
B. Mandated Disclosure and Its Discontents 
While disclosure, also termed targeted transparency, is 
increasingly ascendant as a regulatory tool, it is also controversial. 
There is a growing body of literature debating the problems with 
mandatory disclosure and how to fix them.231 There is also growing 
scrutiny of the promulgation of transparency as “a pervasive cliché of 
modern governance” given “uncritical reverence.”232 The idea behind 
transparency is making information public to inform and improve 
individual choices on how to consume, invest, vote, and make other 
important decisions—and to monitor and improve the behavior of 
information disclosers who must be attentive to market preferences.233 
The reality may fall short of theory, however.234 
One of the most powerful and repeated critiques regarding the 
ineffectiveness of disclosures is that the typical individual is 
overloaded with information.235 Information overload can arise from 
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detailed disclosure requirements and from the accumulation of many 
disclosures in various domains of an individual’s life.236 Moreover, the 
typical consumer is likely to have mediocre literacy or numeracy skills 
and therefore is unable to digest disclosures effectively.237 
In short, the hope for a better-informed choice is a false one.238 
Yet the fiction is sustained because regulation by disclosures looks 
attractively cheap—to legislators at least—because there is no need 
for government expenditures to engage in expensive oversight or to 
hammer out detailed conduct rules and monitor them.239 
In addition to the critiques of mandated disclosure in the 
literature, the private-data, public-safety conflicts discussed thus far 
illustrate two additional, major limitations of consumer-oriented 
general disclosure. First, general disclosure is better suited for alerting 
the public to known dangers rather than detecting and preventing 
them.240 Second, general disclosure may not be feasible where 
information is proprietary, raising Fifth Amendment takings clause 
concerns when the government requires release of the information to 
the general public.241 To address these concerns, the next Part 
discusses a fresh approach to information access to reduce 
constitutional concerns and otherwise prohibitive costs to business 
interests while still allowing sufficient bounded access to detect and 
prevent threats to public health and safety. 
III.  EXPERT-ORIENTED BOUNDED ACCESS 
Despite all the critiques,242 general public disclosure is still nice—
if you can get it. Too often, however, companies prevail in arguing 
about the perils of general public disclosure.243 Rather than allowing 
data that is important to public health and safety to be locked away 
altogether, another approach short of consumer-oriented public 
 
information processing costs); see also, e.g., Mark I. Hwang & Jerry W. Lin, Information 
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disclosure is needed. This Article proposes bounded access as a way 
to unlock such important protected information for an audience best 
suited to use it. Such a model would allow access to otherwise 
protected private data by experts and motivated groups. Only those 
with the ability to design and adhere to a data protection plan to 
ensure use is for the purpose of addressing important public health 
and safety issues would be allowed to access the database. 
The bounded access approach can be used in lieu of general 
public disclosure where public disclosure is otherwise barred by 
protections for trade secrets, property law, or contractual 
confidentiality terms.244 Bounded access is also a way to ameliorate 
the powerful business objections that general disclosure of sensitive 
information might otherwise defeat progress.245 Finally, even where 
general public disclosure is available, a bounded access regime may 
give experts more richly detailed information with which to detect 
and prevent public health and safety harms. 
A. Expert Rather than Lay Audience 
The bounded access concept proposed here is a model of data 
disclosure that begins with approval of a data protection protocol and 
discloses information to persons with the training to analyze the data 
needed to detect and prevent public health and safety hazards. To 
gain bounded access, users would need to demonstrate that data 
access would serve a public or safety purpose and submit a data 
protection protocol, including demonstrated safeguards. Rather than 
piling more disclosures on the bewildered, information-overloaded 
general consumer, bounded access is limited to trained professionals 
such as researchers who are ethically obligated to comply with data-
use and protection safeguards and attorneys who are ethically bound 
to abide by limitations on disclosure. Such trained and motivated 
information-seekers are also better suited to maximize the value of 
disclosure by using their expertise to detect potential threats to public 
safety. 
As a first line of detection and defense, public health researchers 
are a crucial audience for bounded access. Today, such researchers 
are bound by a web of laws, regulations, and ethical principles that 
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safeguard research subjects and protect against nonconsensual 
disclosures of personally identifiable data.246 Sanctions for violations 
of such protections for sensitive data can extend beyond professional 
penalties to include civil and criminal penalties.247 Researchers thus 
have deep expertise in complying with complex limits on the uses of 
data and revelation of identifiable information that may prove 
damaging. Researchers also have expertise in conducting analyses 
with de-identified data to extract important information while 
limiting any damage to an individual entity.248 
Disclosure to such trained professionals can contain limitations 
to mitigate any potential damage to individual private entities, such as 
prohibiting the release of individually identifiable information while 
facilitating research. Such protected access overcomes Fifth 
Amendment takings claims that have bedeviled attempts at 
mandating public disclosure of public health, safety, and 
environmental information implicating trade secrets.249 Courts have 
held that protective orders limiting access to permitted users and for 
specified purposes obviate the Fifth Amendment takings issue 
triggered by compelled disclosure of trade secrets.250 While bounded 
access is different than a protective order, which is typically limited to 
the facts and parties in specific litigation, its user and use restrictions 
should similarly obviate Fifth Amendment takings concerns. 
Limiting the audience renders disclosure nonpublic, averting 
Fifth Amendment takings concerns.251 For example, the D.C. Circuit 
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in Exxon Corp. v. FTC252 held that a release of business information, 
including trade secrets, to Congress is not public divulgement, and 
thus “does not impair the value of the trade secrets involved . . . [or] 
involve a deprivation prior to which a hearing is required.”253 
Responding to the claim that Congress may publicly disclose the 
released information, the D.C. Circuit held that “[c]ourts must 
presume that the committees of Congress will exercise their powers 
responsibly and with due regard for the rights of affected parties.”254 
In other words, we are all professionals here. Courts may presume 
that professionals will comply with protections accompanying 
specific-purpose and limited-audience disclosure of information 
important to public safety. 
B. Epidemiological Insights on Privacy and Public Protection 
The bounded access proposal draws insights from epidemiology, 
the science of detecting and preventing threats to public health.255 
Epidemiology investigates the patterns and causes of threats to health 
and safety in populations of people.256 An important tool in this 
endeavor is amassing and using sensitive, highly private data for 
public health surveillance.257 The goal of disease surveillance is to 
systematically gather and pool data to detect the causes, prevalence, 
incidences, and consequences of injury or disease.258 Data sharing and 
pooling for disease surveillance has venerable roots running back to 
the nineteenth century in U.S. and international practice.259 For 
example, public health surveillance led to the discovery that a 
defective vaccine had caused polio in 40,000 children and left 200 
children paralyzed.260 Such epidemiological surveillance also led to 
the linkage between high-absorbency tampons and toxic shock 
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syndrome.261 Trying to detect threats to population health without 
such data pooling would be laboring “in the darkness of ignorance,” 
as Assistant Surgeon General J.W. Trask put it in 1915.262 
Epidemiological surveillance often involves the collection of 
highly sensitive data such as HIV or other infectious disease status.263 
Such information is publicly reported at the aggregate level with 
strong protections against damaging disclosure about particular 
individuals.264 The discipline of epidemiology thus has important 
insights about protecting privacy without stifling the generation of 
knowledge about threats to public health and safety. 
While disease surveillance is often conducted by governmental 
entities,265 the discipline of epidemiology also shows the import of 
making data available to nongovernmental researchers for analysis. 
Many expert eyes are needed to advance protection and prevention 
(indeed, imagine where biomedical science and technology would be 
in a world where only the government conducted research). The task 
of uncovering and combatting threats to public health and safety 
cannot just be centralized within the government.266 The recent GM 
and NHTSA fiasco illustrates the risks of such an approach.267 While 
the government has an important role to play in gathering and 
disseminating information, much of the data gathering and analysis is 
conducted by nongovernmental researchers with specialized 
expertise. Nongovernmental, expert eyes, such as researchers or 
consumer protection attorneys, are like beneficial microbes for the 
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surveillance and investigation system, unearthing important factors 
for threat detection and prevention and airing issues in need of 
attention. 
C. Two Tracks of Disclosure: Thick, Rich Information and Thin, 
Digestible Information 
The data needs for an expert audience are very different from 
those of “Chris Consumer,” who represents the paradigmatic 
audience for mandated disclosure policies and critiques.268 For the 
individual consumer to effectively digest information, the information 
needs to be made thin and grabby—pared down and rendered catchy 
through images or sounds that seize rather than dull attention.269 For 
population-level surveillance and protection, disclosures should be 
thick and detail rich—precisely the opposite of effective disclosures 
for individuals. It is also important to offer technical disclosures 
detailing sampling techniques as well as the raw data to permit 
effective systematic study.270 
This difference in form arises from the difference in uses of data. 
While consumers and other individuals seek identifying information 
to make choices among goods or services, data disseminated to 
experts for population-level protection needs to be detail rich to 
enable detection of patterns of harm and to enable more effective 
prevention. While bounded access limits the audience for 
information, it should allow for more meaningful information for 
purposes of harm detection and prevention. 
Disclosure of such important data exacts costs on the reporting 
entities. In addition to informing the design of disclosures, an 
epidemiological perspective also provides insights about how to 
address concerns about damage resulting from disclosure. At the 
national level, public health surveillance similarly calls for collection 
of sensitive data, including disease findings that implicate patient 
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privacy.271 At the international level, disease surveillance also calls for 
reporting potentially embarrassing data that might have economic 
repercussions for nations reporting disease outbreaks.272 Moreover, 
epidemiological research often operates on sensitive human-subject 
data, including protected medical records.273 
The corporate privacy interest secured through trade secret, 
contract, and propertization is far less compelling than a person’s 
privacy interest in health data. As the Supreme Court has explained, 
unlike human subjects, corporations “are endowed with public 
attributes” because “[t]hey have a collective impact upon society, 
from which they derive the privilege of acting as artificial entities.”274 
Moreover, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(“HIPAA”) reflects a democratic judgment about the intensely 
private nature of health information.275 Yet even after the enactment 
of HIPAA, researchers have access to patient health data to enable 
public health research to detect and prevent harms.276 A fortiori, 
privacy should not be a bar to access in the less compelling context of 
corporate privacy. 
Moreover, epidemiological research practices such as de-
identification can help inform the scope of protection for particularly 
sensitive business information. Since the passage of HIPAA, 
researchers have further refined strategies for using de-identified data 
that is pooled and aggregated to detect public health threats.277 Where 
companies have a particularly compelling need for protection and 
where de-identification does not render investigation infeasible, 
bounded disclosure could include only data stripped of identifiers 
linking the information to a particular brand or company. 
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Because disclosure to the research public is different from 
disclosure to the consuming, individual public, there should be two 
tracks of disclosure. The disclosure track at the consumer level should 
draw on insights about paring down information and making data 
more digestible.278 The second track of disclosure to the research 
public should be detail rich with sufficient technical information to 
facilitate standardization and adjustment for statistical analyses.279 
Access could be restricted to researchers with the proper credentials 
and who have IRB clearance, ensuring sufficient controls are in place 
to protect sensitive data.280 
In some circumstances, the two-track model may become just a 
single, higher-track model of disclosure where an industry or 
company succeeds in convincing legislators that information is 
particularly sensitive. Even if there is not sufficient consensus for 
mandating general individual-level disclosure, there should be 
bounded access to public health, safety, and environmental 
information. Ultimately, reducing the costs of disclosure is a better 
way to improve the generation of data from multiple sources. 
Reducing the costs of cooperation is more desirable than coercing 
resistant entities because there are innumerable creative ways to 
resist, thereby undermining mandated general public disclosure.281 
CONCLUSION 
Challenging the conventional view that there is no right to 
privacy for corporations, this Article has illuminated how companies 
enjoy plenty of privacy through trade secret, contract, and the 
propertization of information.282 These regimes create business 
privacy by other means and are backed by sanctions.283 Data 
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ownership and control has the power to illuminate or obscure dangers 
to public health and safety. Keeping experts and the public data 
impoverished can impact what makes it onto the policy and research 
agenda, what receives sustained attention, and what is under-
recognized or hidden until the victim counts rise and become too high 
to overlook. 284 
For some major public safety and security challenges, such as 
deaths from auto defects, toxic emissions, hazardous products, and 
drug counterfeiting, crucial data is controlled by private industry 
actors. The data is private in two senses—it is both proprietary and 
secluded from scrutiny. When the interests in private data and public 
safety conflict, what should the law do? 
This Article proposes bounded access as a fresh approach to 
addressing the legal, theoretical, and practical limitations of 
consumer-oriented general public disclosure. Where information is 
propertized, general public access—even to protect public health and 
safety—may not be feasible because of Fifth Amendment takings 
concerns.285 Even if there are not constitutional barriers, there may be 
formidable political barriers, as illustrated by the repeated demise of 
the sunshine in litigation acts introduced in Congress over the years.286 
Moreover, even where general disclosure might be an option, 
information-overloaded consumers may not be best situated to utilize 
the information effectively to detect and prevent threats to health and 
safety.287 
A bounded access model of disclosure addresses these challenges 
by unlocking otherwise protected private data to grant access to 
experts capable of effectively using data to detect health and safety 
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harms while honoring data protections. The bounded access model 
can be used where general public disclosure is barred by 
constitutional or other protections for propertized information or is 
otherwise not feasible because of political opposition to general 
public disclosure. Bounded access may also be valuable in addition to 
general public disclosure by giving experts richer, more technically 
detailed information, permitting effective investigation to detect and 
prevent public health and safety harms. Companies thereby retain a 
form of privacy. They retain control over their proprietary 
information for most purposes, with only a limited, safeguarded 
release for threat detection. The goal of this fresh approach is to 
maximize risk-detection and harm-prevention capabilities, while 
reducing the incentives to conceal damaging information for fear of 
harming a particular brand or product. 
